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When Daylight Reveals Neighborhood
Nightmares: The Duty of Builders and
Developers to Disclose Off-Site
Environmental Conditions
SERENA M. WILLIAMS*
In 1987, Mark Holt discovered that his "Home-Sweet-Home" was
not so sweet when the Georgia Environmental Protection Division
detected low levels of methane gas on one of the lots in his subdivision.'
The testing was performed because the subdivision in which he had
purchased his home was adjacent to a landfill which the City of Warner
Robins, Georgia, had previously operated and then shut down in 19772
In 1989, an engineering firm hired by the city concluded that a portion
of the closed landfill was encroaching on lots in the subdivision,
including Holt's? The fill material was generating methane gas which
could threaten the homes.4 Because the removal of the fill material was
costly, the engineer recommended that the fill material be left intact,
rendering the homes uninhabitable.' When engineers hired by Holt
found methane gas on his property in 1990, Holt had to move out of his
house.6 He found out the hard way that buying a house in a subdivision
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law, Louisville, KY, B.A.
1981, Smith College; J.D. 1984, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M. 1992, George
Washington University National Law Center. I am grateful for the assistance of Stephanie
Hickerson Harris, my former research assistant, Professor Robert Stenger, my colleague at the
University of Louisville, and Professor Mary Josephine Wiggins at the University of San Diego
School of Law.
I City of Warner Robins v. Holt, 470 S.E.2d 238, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Methane is a naturally occurring gas produced by decay during the decomposition process.
It is a concern in landfills due to its explosive characteristics. Methane gas also kills vegetation by
displacing oxygen from the root zone. See RACHEL'S HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS #226, March 27,
1991, at 1.
City of Warner Robins, 470 S.E.2d at 240.
6 Mark Holt subsequently filed suit against the city asserting claims of trespass, abatable
and permanent nuisance, and emotional distress. He was awarded $59,000 for diminution of
market value of his house, which the jury indicated represented the full market value of the
property, and $52,000 for emotional distress or for loss of peace, happiness or enjoyment The city
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adjacent to a landfill, even one no longer in operation, could be as
harmful as buying a home directly on the surface of one.
Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, "let the buyer beware,"
neither the builder nor developer of the homes in a subdivision would
have a duty to disclose to Mr. Holt (or any other prospective purchaser)
that the homes were built near the site of a closed landfill.7 The doctrine
of caveat emptor, however, has grown into disfavor as courts and
legislative bodies have become more protective of consumers' rights in
the area of residential real estate sales.' As a result, a seller's duty to
disclose material defects in the property being sold has greatly ex-
panded. Sellers have been found liable for failure to disclose conditions
ranging from a leaking roof I to termite infestation ° to the use of a
banned substance for insulation." Sellers have also been found liable
for failing to disclose that a home was the site of a multiple murder ten
years prior to the sale 2 and for failing to disclose that a home had a
reputation for being haunted. 3 In all these cases, however, the defect
in the home was an on-site condition impacting either the physical
integrity of the structure or the psychological well-being of the
inhabitants. Thus, even in a jurisdiction that requires disclosure, the
professional seller of Mark Holt's home would not have had a duty to
disclose the proximity of the subdivision to a landfill since the duty has
not generally been expanded to require disclosure of potentially harmful
lost its appeal on these two issues. Id. at 241.
' Other recent events indicate a desire by home buyers to seek relief from developers who
fail to disclose information about landfills in the vicinity of a community. In Greensboro, North
Carolina, the City Council agreed to buy back houses in a subdivision-developed as a public-
private partnership to provide affordable homes to first-time buyers-to end a dispute with the
residents, who claimed the developer failed to disclose that a landfill across the street from their
property would be expanded. The city was buying back the houses in the community from
residents who could not get a fair market value for their property. Kelly Simmons, City Won't Buy
Nealtown Home, GREENSBORO NEWS AND REc., October 24, 1996, at BG2.
' Paula C. Murray, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REy. 689, 690 (1992); see also Margaret A. Morgan, Note, When the Walls
Come Tumbling Down: Theories of Recovery for Defective Housing, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 670,
682-93 (1982) (discussing the trend away from caveat emptor).
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla- 1985); Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133 (IIl. App.
1979).
" Godfrey v. Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Ct. App. 1982); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d
672 (Wash. 1960).
Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
2 Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
3 Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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off-site environmental conditions. 4
Thousands of facilities in the nation generate industrial and
household wastes and other pollutants that may pose health threats to
the residents of the communities in which these facilities are located.
In spite of this potential threat, builders and developers construct homes
in close proximity to these potentially harmful facilities. These
homeowners may be able to bring a tort action, e.g., in nuisance, against
the facility. 5 However, for the homeowners to bring an action against
the builder or developer who "brought" them to the nuisance, i.e., the
landfill, without disclosing its existence, the builder-developer must first
be found to have a duty to disclose the off-site environmental condition.
This Article discusses whether the builders and developers of residential
homes should have a duty to disclose off-site environmental conditions
such as landfills and incinerators to home buyers. Part I of this Article
traces the general development of a seller's duty to disclose on-site
conditions. The duty developed into one which requires the seller to
disclose on-site defects that materially affect the value and desirability
of the property which are known to him but not to the buyer. Part II
describes how the duty to disclose has been expanded by courts and
legislative bodies to include a duty to disclose off-site conditions. The
courts consider a variety of factors when finding a duty to disclose on-
site environmental conditions. Part III of this Article discusses these
factors within the context of off-site environmental conditions. The
Article concludes with a discussion of parameters on the duty to
disclose off-site conditions, a duty of honesty and fair dealing required
in a modem society.
" But see Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995) (seller had the duty to disclose that
a landfill was near the home); Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(sellers had a duty to disclose offensive and noisy activities of neighbors which were determined
to be a nuisance).
IS See, e.g, Blair v. Anderson, 570 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (owners of property
adjacent to landfill who suffered a special injury of water flow blockage to a creek on their property
had standing to bring a private right of action for abatement); Wayne County v. Tennessee Solid
Waste Disposal Board, 756 S.W.2d 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that farm owners could
bring a private nuisance action against neighboring landfill which caused contamination of their
well water).
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY TO
DISCLOSE ON-SITE CONDITIONS
Discussions of the seller's duty to disclose usually begin with a
historical analysis of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 6 The doctrine first
appeared in England sometime in the Sixteenth Century 7 and came to
the United States through the common law where it was subsequently
applied to real property conveyances.' 8 Under the doctrine, the seller of
real property had no duty to disclose facts unknown to the buyer in an
arm's length transaction. 9 Instead, the buyer had a duty to obtain the
information necessary, usually by inspection, to judge the value of the
property offered for sale.2" The doctrine of caveat emptor, however,
began to erode when modem courts and legislatures began to impose
greater duties of fairness and reasonableness first on sellers of goods
and then later on sellers of real property in order to inject a sense of fair
play into the marketplace. Although a disclosure duty is often viewed
as a modem concept, these courts were actually applying ancient ideas:
"[C]aveat emptor is not to be found among the reputable ideas of the
Middle Ages."'"
A. Looking for Roots of a Duty to Disclose: The Words of Saint
Thomas Aquinas
The arguments for implementing a duty to disclose on sellers of
goods has been traced to the thirteenth century writings of Saint Thomas
Aquinas.22 The rationale which underlies Aquinas' arguments for a duty
6 For a complete discussion of the history of caveat emptor, see Walton H. Hamilton, The
Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
'" Id. Hamilton writes that the expression first appeared in print in a legal discussion
referring to horse trading. A buyer is cautioned "to make sure of the goodness of his bargain in
horse-flesh while yet there is time, if the horse be sold without a warranty, it is 'at the other's peril,
for his eyes and his taste ought to be his judges' in that case." Id. at 1164 (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey noted in its opinion expanding the duty to disclose that, "Legal
historians will continue to debate whether the doctrine of caveat emptor was the creation of the
laissez-faire judges or merely a rule of legal convenience reflecting the fact that most land
transactions involved vacant land." Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 425 (N.J. 1995).
"8 Richard M. Jones, Risk Allocation and the Sale of Defective Used Housing in Ohio-Should
Silence Be Golden?, 20 CAP. U.L. REv. 215 (1991).
19 id. at 2 17.
2 Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation, 44
DEPAULL. REv. 381 (1995).
2 Hamilton, supra note 16, at 1136 (emphasis omitted).
2 Hamilton, supra note 16, at 1138.
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to disclose defects in the sale of goods provides a framework for
twentieth century arguments to expand the disclosure duty in the sale of
real property. The focus of both is on the concepts of justice and fair
dealing.
Aquinas' writings discuss standards of conduct for trade dealings
in medieval times, positing that a seller ought to manifest defects in the
goods sold. Aquinas declared that a seller ought to reveal to the buyer
defects in the item where the defects are substantial, i.e., where they
affect the substance of the item, and where the defect would render the
item harmful or not useful for the known intention of the buyer.23
Furthermore, the seller should reveal hidden defects which go to the
quality of the item if there is some danger of serious harm from the
defect.24
Aquinas' rationale for a seller's disclosure of a defect in an item
sold is found in the development of his answer to his question, "Is the
seller bound to declare any defect in the thing sold?"25 A negative reply
to the question raises four objections to disclosure of the defect by the
seller: 1) The seller should not be responsible for any mistake a buyer
may make by being rash and failing to make due inquiries; 2) Someone
who points out the flaws in an object he is selling is acting foolishly by
doing something that hampers his activity; 3) A man is not bound to
counsel another or to tell him the truth, although no one is entitled to tell
lies; and 4) The only reason for disclosing flaws in an object for sale is
to lower the price. 6
In support of an affirmative reply to the question of whether a
seller should disclose a defect, Aquinas answers by first explaining that
a person is never entitled to put another in the way of danger or loss,
although neither is one obligated to give another assistance which would
' BENEDICT HENRY MERKELBACH, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS, (9th ed.), Belgium:
Desclde de Brouwer et Cie, 1954, Vol. II, pp. 542-44.
24 Id. See also SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, QUAESTIONEs DISPUTATE, II, q.5, a.2, Rome:
Marietti, 8th ed., 1949. Raymond Spiazzi, O.P., editor, p. 32-3.
2 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGLE, Ila, ll, q. 77, a.3, p. 221 (Blackfliars
1975). Aquinas wrote the SUMMA THEOLOGIAE between 1259 and 1269. THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO AQUINAS 18 (Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump eds., 1993). It is constructed
entirely of questions demanding an affirmative or negative reply, thus presenting an issue with two
sides. Id. at 15. The questions are subdivided into subquestions called articles. The development
of the article's question consists of four parts that begin with fixed formulas: 1) the introduction
to arguments supporting the negative reply; 2) the introduction to arguments supporting the
opposite reply; 3) the beginning of the writer's own doctrinal explanation; 4) rejoinders to the
objections that were raised at the beginning. Id. at 18-9.
26 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIE, supra note 25, at 222-23.
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promote the other's advantage. 2 ' A seller places a buyer in a position
of danger or loss by offering him defective goods where the flaw makes
the use of the thing sold difficult or harmful. Aquinas concludes that if
such defects are not obvious and the seller does not disclose them, the
sale is fraudulent and the seller is bound to make restitution.28 On the
other hand, where the flaw is obvious and where the seller sufficiently
discounts the price, he is not bound to disclose the defect.29
Saint Thomas Aquinas closes by replying to the objections to
defect disclosure by the seller. He retorts that since a man judges of
what he knows, a buyer is not in a position to make a judgment unless
the defects are disclosed by the seller. However, a seller need not
advertise his flaws by public crier, since to do so would frighten off
potential buyers before they have had a chance to examine the good
qualities of the item for sale. Thus Aquinas posits a seller is bound to
privately inform every interested buyer who is in a position to assess the
good and bad points, since a thing can be defective in one respect but
very useful in others.3"
In his rejoinder to the objection that a man is not bound to counsel
another, Aquinas replies that such an obligation exists where failure to
disclose might endanger another.3 A member of the Thomastic Institute
explained Aquinas' rejoinder:
Is it enough for him to cut down the price and say nothing?
Hardly. The drop in price will take care of any damage that
might otherwise have come to the buyer in the sale itself; but
it will not take care of the gun later exploding in the buyer's
face, nor [in the case of a flawed diamond] of the explosion
of wrath from his fiancee who happens to be a jeweler's
daughter.
3 2
Those modem courts which find a duty to disclose substantial and
harmful defects in the sale of real property are merely applying the
centuries-old notion of fair dealing in the marketplace. The protection
offered to the buyers of the defective gun and the flawed diamond
27 Id. at 223.




32 WALTER FARRELL, III, A COMPANION TO THE SuMMA 237 (1940).
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should likewise be offered to home buyers. To rephrase Aquinas'
rejoinder, where a "duty to speak exists, the failure to speak constitutes
unfair conduct likely to cause harm.3"
B. Development of the Duty to Disclose in Residential Real Estate
Sales
Centuries after Aquinas' discourse, the general rule regarding
disclosure was that an action would not lie for tacit nondisclosure; mere
silence or a passive failure to disclose facts of which the defendant had
knowledge could not serve as grounds for a tort action. 4 This rule
reflected the old tort notion that no liability exists for nonfeasance or
merely doing nothing.35 The rule was considered to have been properly
applied where the defect undisclosed was patent or where plaintiff had
equal opportunity to obtain information which he might be expected to
use.
36
Over time, exceptions to the general rule developed. For example,
when the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation to one
another, full disclosure of all material facts might be required.37 Other
factors considered in creating exceptions include the relation of the
parties to each other, the nature of the fact not disclosed, the importance
of the fact not disclosed, and the general class to which the person who
is concealing the information belongs.38 A duty to speak also arises
when what is not disclosed makes other representations misleading or
when a statement honestly made is later discovered to be false.3 9
In the context of the sale of residential real estate, the duty to
3 Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994).
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (5th ed.
1984).
a" For furher discussion ofnonfeasance and misfeasance, see Jean Rowe & Theodore Silver,
The Jurisprudence ofAction and Inaction in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance
and Misfeasance from the Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUo. L. REv. 807 (1995).
36 KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 106.
31 Id. at 738. The Restatement also provides for liability for nondisclosure in certain
circumstances. A duty to disclose is found where the parties have a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1977). A person is required to disclose only those matters that he has reason to know will be
regarded by the other as important in determining his course of action in the transaction in hand.
Id. at cmt c.
31 KEETON ETAL., supra note 34, § 106.
3'9 CLARENCE MORRIS& C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 307 (2d ed. 1980) (citing
Bergeron v. Dupont, 359 A.2d 627 (N.H. 1976) and Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)).
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
disclose was not adopted as quickly as it was with regard to the sale of
goods. The law, at one point, was said to offer "greater protection to
the purchaser of a seventy-nine cent dog leash than it does to the
purchase of a 40,000-dollar house."' Nevertheless, courts did begin to
extend the doctrine to circumstances where a latent defect in the
property or in the physical structure threatened the residents with harm.
The latent defect in these cases usually related to the physical
structure of the property. For example, an action for fraud in the sale
of real property was upheld in a 1960 California case where the
subdivider knew, but failed to disclose, that the lot sold to a couple was
in the vicinity of an ancient landslide, in an area of underground water,
and that the house was constructed on fill placed on the lot without
adequate compaction.4' The court found that, "[u]nder these circum-
stances, [the subdivider's] duty of disclosure is clear," even though the
couple made no examination of the premises other than viewing it.42
The subdivider was under a duty to disclose facts that materially affect
the value and desirability of the property which were known to him but
not to the buyer, particularly where the buyer was not competent to
judge the facts without expert advice.43
That same year, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
affirmed a lower court decision finding that a seller was under a duty to
disclose termite infestation to the buyers of a frame house." Termite
infestation of a frame building was considered by the court to be
"manifestly a serious and dangerous condition" that, if not checked,
could cause a complete collapse of the building.45 Furthermore, at the
time of the sale, the condition was latent, and not readily observable
upon reasonable inspection, since all surface evidence of the termite
infestation had been removed by the pest control specialist.'a
The seller's duty to disclose in real estate sales developed into a
duty to disclose material facts which are not readily observable and are
not known to the buyer. Material facts are on-site defects affecting the
' Paul O. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property,
53 GEO. L.J. 633, 633 (1965).
Buist v. Dudley De Velbiss Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
I ld. at 263.
41 Id. at 264.
" Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960).
45 Id. at 675.
Id. See also Maguire v. Masino, 325 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
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habitability, value, and desirability of the property.47 Examples of
material facts include a leaking roof,48 sewage back-up,49 water under
the foundation footers, 0 and landslides.5 '
A few courts have extended the duty to disclose material facts to
conditions affecting the inhabitants of property that may psychologi-
cally affect a substantial number of buyers."2 The California case, Reed
v. King,3 was the first to hold that a seller must disclose to the buyer a
fact not impacting the physical structure, but instead impacting the
psychological well-being of the inhabitants.54 In Reed, the seller and his
real estate agent knew that a brutal multiple murder had occurred a
decade before in the house, but failed to disclose it to the buyer. The
seller even asked a neighbor not to inform the buyer of the event, but
after the buyer moved in the neighbors informed her that no one was
interested in purchasing the house because of the stigma of the multiple
murder."5
In holding that the purchaser stated a cause of action, the court
held that murder is not a fact for which a duty of inquiry and discovery
can sensibly be imposed upon the buyer since murder is not such a
common occurrence that buyers should be charged with discovering this
possibility. 6 Recognizing that reputation and history can have a
significant effect on property values, the court noted that the reputation
that "George Washington slept here" can increase property values;
conversely, ill-repute may depress property values. 7 Arguably,
permitting such an "irrational" and subjective consideration as a basis
for an action in fraudulent nondisclosure undermines the stability of all
conveyances. However, the court did not view its decision as endorsing
"' See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d, 625, 628 (Fla. 1985); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
41 Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 625.
4' Shane v. Hoffiman, 324 A.2d 532 (Pa. Super Ct. 1974).
' Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 886 (W. Va. 1982).
51 Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
51 Paula C. Murray, What Constitutes a Defect in Real Property?, 22 REAL EST. L.J. 61
(1993).
53 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
s Murray, supra note 50, at 61.
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the materiality of facts predicated on insubstantial or fancied harms.58
Perhaps the most unusual case finding a duty of disclosure for a
situation impacting the psy6hological well-being of the inhabitants of
real property is Stambovsky v. Ackley, 9 in which a New York court held
that a seller had a duty to disclose that a house had a reputation for
being haunted.' In a pun-filled decision,6' the court allowed the buyer
to rescind the contract and recover the down payment even though New
York followed the strict rule of caveat emptor.62 Although the decision
is often criticized and it has been suggested that it is "preposterous,"63
the court's analysis followed traditional rationales to find a duty to
disclose.
The doctrine of caveat emptor requires that a buyer assess the
fitness and value of his purchase. Buyers often meet this obligation by
inspecting the property and searching public records. However, the
court found that even the most meticulous inspection and search would
not reveal the presence of ghosts on the premises or the house's
reputation as being haunted.' The court found no public policy for
denying the buyer relief for failure to discover a condition which even
the most prudent purchaser could not be expected to contemplate.65
That the seller had reported the presence of the ghosts in publica-
tions and had placed the home on the village's walking tour indicated
that the seller deliberately fostered the public belief that her home was
possessed." Focusing on that fact, the court declared that "[h]aving
undertaken to inform the public at large, to whom she had no legal
relationship, about the supernatural occurrences on her property, she
11 Id. One commentator noted that, rationally or not, a substantial number of buyers would
not want to live in a house in which a violent death has occurred, reducing the pool of potential
buyers and thus the value of the property. The information must be disclosed even if the buyer may
not be acting rationally. Murray, supra note 50, at 48.
51 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
61 Id. at 673.
" In one paragraph, the court wrote the following:
While I agree with Supreme Court that... in his pursuit of a legal remedy for
fraudulent misrepresentation against the seller, plaintiffhasn't a ghost of a
chance, I am nevertheless moved by the spirit of equity to allow the buyer to
seek rescission of the contract of sale and recovery of his down payment
Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 675.
' James D. Lawlor, Burden of Disclosing Defects Shifting to Sellers, 78 A.B.A.J. 90
(Aug. 1992).
" Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
6 Id.
6 Id. at 674.
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may be said to owe no less of a duty to [the buyer of that home]."67 The
court was offended that the seller was not only attempting to take
advantage of the buyer's ignorance, but that the seller had "created and
perpetuated" a condition about which a buyer is unlikely to inquire.6"
Thus, the court carved out a narrow exception to New York's rule of
caveat emptor using factors normally considered when finding liability
for non-disclosure, as in the case of a defect that is not readily observ-
able to the buyer.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE OFF-SITE CONDITIONS
The duty to disclose defects in the sale of real property has
generally been limited to on-site conditions which materially affect the
value and desirability of the property. In 1995, the New Jersey
Supreme Court expanded the disclosure duty to include an off-site
condition.69 The court held that a builder-developer of new homes and
the brokers marketing those homes had a duty to disclose to prospective
buyers that the homes had been constructed near an abandoned
hazardous waste dump. However, within months of that decision, the
New Jersey legislature passed a statute limiting it.70 Evaluation of the
Strawn v. Canuso decision and of statutory duties to disclose reveals a
struggle to strike a balance between protecting the buyer from harm and
protecting the builder/developer from limitless liability. New Jersey,
however, is not the first state to require some disclosure of neighbor-
hood conditions. A few states have mandated disclosure of some off-
site conditions through legislation.
A. Judicially Created Duty to Disclose Off-Site Environmental
Conditions
On April 25, 1995, the Supreme Court of New Jersey established
a duty on the part of residential builder/developers and their brokers to
disclose off-site physical conditions both known and unknown, "and not
readily observable by the buyer if the existence of those conditions is
of sufficient materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of
the property and therefore, render the property substantially less
67 Id. at 677.
63 Id.
69 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
70 NEW JERSEY ST. ANN. S 46: 3C- 1 through 3C-10 (West 1997).
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
desirable or valuable to the objectively reasonable buyer.""' The
lawsuit was a class action filed on behalf of 150 to 200 families who
bought homes in a development near a closed landfill that contained
toxic wastes. Noting that "location is the universal benchmark of the
value and desirability of property," the court deemed that professional
sellers have the duty to disclose to home buyers the location of any
off-site physical condition that an objectively reasonable and informed
buyer would deem material to the transaction.7"
1. The Facts
The circumstances of Strawn v. Canuso" presented the court with
an excellent opportunity to expand the duty to disclose to off-site
environmental hazards. A professional builder knew of the existence
of a landfill and had been warned of the possible hazards of building in
such close proximity to a landfill leaking hazardous wastes. Despite the
warning the builder proceeded with plans to develop a subdivision near
the site of the off-site environmental hazard. When marketing the
subdivision, the builder-developer advertised only the desirable off-site
conditions. A sense of fair dealing and honesty led the court to hold that
the builder-developer should have also disclosed undesirable off-site
conditions.
a. The Buzby Landfill
The Buzby Landfill consisted of two tracts of property, a 19-acre
portion owned by RCA and a contiguous 37-acre parcel owned by the
Voorhees Township. A landfill was operated on the site from 1966 to
1978.74 The landfill was not licensed to receive liquid industrial or
chemical wastes; nevertheless, it received large amounts of such
wastes.
75
Toxic wastes dumped into the Buzby Landfill began to escape into
the ground due to the lack of a liner or cap on the landfill. Leachate
7' Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420,431 (N.J. 1995).
72 Id. at 431-32.
73 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
7 Id. at 423.
71 Plaintiffs state in their brief that one well-known toxic waste hauler disposed of over
280,000 gallons of chemical waste liquid at the landfill in the year 1974. Brief for Appellants at
5, Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141 (No. A-4764-91) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), afd, 657
A.2d 672 (N.J. 1995).
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was seeping into a downstream lake and into the groundwater. Tests
performed by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
and Energy (DEPE) indicated the presence of hazardous waste in
groundwater, in marsh sediments taken from the landfill, and in lakes
southeast of the landfill.76 Hazardous gases also emanated from the
landfill. The federal Environmental Protection Agency confirmed that
residents' complaints about odors and associated physical symptoms
were consistent with expected reactions to exposure to gases from
landfills."
The Buzby Landfill appeared to be a disaster-in-waiting with
regard to the surrounding community. In support of such an assertion,
the plaintiffs cited to a report by the federal government's Agency for
Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) assessing the impact of
the Buzby Landfill on the health of the residents of the surrounding
community. The report concluded that the releases of contaminants into
groundwater and the potential for such releases to migrate off-site posed
a potential threat to human health and the environment." ATSDR also
cited a 1980 study by EPA warning that the proposed housing develop-
ment had the potential of developing into a "future Love Canal" if
construction was permitted.79
The ATSDR recommended that the EPA evaluate the releases of
contaminants from the landfill under the Hazardous Ranking System
(HRS) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) ° to determine whether the landfill
should be included on the National Priorities List. 81 Inclusion on the
National Priorities List would have targeted Buzby Landfill for
remedial action under CERCLA and thus for clean-up funded by the
federal government. 2
76 Strawn, 657 A.2d at 422.
77 Id.
" Appellant's Brief at 8, Canuso (No. A-4764-9 1).
79 Id.
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994).
SI Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), afJ'd, 657 A.2d
420 (N.J.1995).
2 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (1994). Remedial action includes such actions as storage or
confinement of hazardous substances using dikes, trenches, or ditches; replacement of leaking
containers; incineration; off-site transport of hazardous wastes; and provision of alternative water
supplies. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). It also includes the costs ofpermanent relocation of residents and
businesses and community facilities where relocation is more cost-effective than and environmen-
tally preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment, or destruction of hazardous substances.
Id.
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The Buzby Landfill did not qualify for inclusion on the National
Priorities List. Plaintiffs declared that the reason that Buzby was not
included on list was the small population in the vicinity of the landfill
at the time the ATSDR study was done. 3 One of the factors utilized in
the HRS formula is the population within a one-mile radius. At the time
the study was performed in 1985, only 97 homes were located within
that radius. 4 The population, of course, increased once defendants
developed the subdivision, but the HRS was not repeated, leading
plaintiffs to conclude that the 1985 HRS did not mean that the site
would fail to qualify for the NPL if it were ranked again at the time of
the lawsuit. Furthermore, plaintiffs pointed out that listing on the NPL
was important only because it would make the site eligible for federal
funding; the state had been able to impose those costs on the site
owners.
8 5
b. Knowledge of Builder-Developer and Its Agent
Plaintiffs alleged that the Canusos, a father-son builder-developer
company, knew about the presence of the landfill when they considered
the site for residential development. As evidence of this fact, a search
of Canuso's files revealed a copy of a 1980 EPA report warning that the
site could become a "future Love Canal" if developed.86 Defendants
also met with employees from DEPE to discuss the prospects of
building homes near the landfill.
A marketing director of the brokerage firm acting as the selling
agent for the development urged his firm and the Canusos to disclose
the existence of the landfill to prospective home buyers. Both parties
refused and instead followed a policy of nondisclosure.87 This policy
continued even after early purchasers complained about odors from the
landfill. The Canusos instructed their representatives never to disclose
the proximity of the landfill.8 One of Canuso's sales managers spoke
with DEPE representative who warned of problems associated with
building a large development near a landfill. The sales manager wrote
"' Appellant's Brief at 5, Incollingo (No. A-4764-91) (Incollingo was joined with Strawn as
a plaintiffin Strawn v. Canuso.).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 6.
88 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 421,423 (N.J. 1995).




a memorandum repeating those warnings and placed it with related
papers in the "hazardous waste" file maintained by defendants. The
Canusos discussed the memorandum, but still refused to inform
potential buyers of the landfill.89
Furthermore, when the New Jersey Real Estate Commission
became aware that homes were going to be built near a potential
hazardous waste site, it made known that it required full disclosure by
selling brokers. On December 14, 1983, the Real Estate Commission
wrote to the Camden County Board of Realtors, stating that the location
of property near a hazardous waste site is information that should be
supplied to potential buyers because of the potential effects on health
and on the value of property."
c. Advertisements for the Subdivision
None of the plaintiffs knew of the existence of the landfill at the
time they purchased their homes and nothing in the sales literature
alluded to its proximity. Instead, the sales literature described the
development, the Woods of Voorhees, as being in the "midst of a
heavily treed forest."'" During the spring of 1985, one newspaper
carried an advertisement for the Woods depicting "two children running
toward a home" with the description underneath: "You can enjoy the
contentment and satisfaction of knowing your children are growing in
the healthy, fresh, country air of this ideal wooded community." 2 The
brochures emphasized the existence of off-site amenities such as
country clubs and shopping malls. Not surprisingly, the advertisements
and brochures failed to mention the existence of a landfill half a mile
from some of the homes.
93
The second development, known as Las Brisas, was described as
a development of "large gracious homes in harmony with the rolling,
wooded terrain." The environment was enhanced "by preserving and
unifying the inherent beauty of the forest."94 Each buyer asserted that
he had relied on the brochures and advertisements when deciding to
s Id. at 424.
'o Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
" Id. at 144.
92 Id. at 145.
93 Id.
4 Id. at 144-45.
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purchase his home. 95
2. The Decision of the Lower Court
On May 5, 1987, the home owners in the Woods of Voorhees and
Las Brisas developments filed a class action complaint on behalf of
between 150 and 200 families who purchased the homes near the closed
landfill. The complaint alleged that the market value of the homes was
diminished at the time of purchase due to their close proximity to the
closed Buzby Landfill, suspected of containing toxic waste. The
compliant also alleged common law fraud, negligent misrepresentations
and concealment, and violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act.96
The judge in the Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County,
granted summary judgments dismissing all claims of the homeowners
because he found that the homebuilders and home-selling brokers had
no duty to disclose the existence of the off-tract landfill to the home-
owners when they were prospective purchasers.97 However, on appeal,
the judges of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, focused on the
"modem" concepts of justice and fair dealing to conclude:
Consistent with the doctrine of justice and fair dealing,
caveat emptor, which is part of our common law, can no
longer be immutable or inflexible in certain circumstances.
One of the great virtues of our common law is 'its dynamic
nature that makes it adaptable to the requirements of society
at the time of its application in court.' Application of caveat
emptor in the present case would work an injustice.9
The court found support for its holding that the builder-developer
had a duty to disclose within several older decisions sustaining a cause
of action for affirmative fraudulent misrepresentations by sellers and
their agents to buyers respecting off-site conditions which affect the
value of land involved in the transaction. In one case cited, the seller
, Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 145 (N.J. 1994).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 147.
Id. (citations omitted). The court cited to the decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445,456, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974), which held that a seller had
a duty to disclose the existence of roach infestation unknown to the buyers.
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made misrepresentations that the purchase of a lake front cottage would
make the purchaser eligible for membership in a country club; 9 in
another, the seller made misrepresentations about the existence of a
street."' The case before the court, however, was not one of affirmative
misrepresentation since statements respecting landfills were allegedly
made to only two of the plaintiffs.
An analogy was drawn by the court to a lower court opinion in
Tobin v. Paprone Construction Co. "' In that case, the court found that
a developer's silence was a fraudulent representation where the
residential home developer failed to disclose to a purchaser that an
adjoining lot owner intended to construct a tennis court with a ten-foot
high fence within one foot of the common boundary line. °2 The court
did not read Tobin to be limited to "situations in which a developer
makes false verbal representations about the environment surrounding
the premises involved in a particular transaction.'1
0 3
Further support for the court's finding that justice and fair dealing
required that the seller disclose the existence of the landfill was found
in the comments to section 551 (2)(e) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The court focused on the discussion in the comment concerning
the changing ethical attitudes in modem business and thus the increas-
ing duty to use reasonable care to disclose facts basic to the
transaction."' 4 Statements in the brochures and advertisements
concerning the off-site amenities also support a finding of a duty to
disclose. Those brochures and advertisements made the off-site
environmental conditions relevant by stating that the area was one safe
for hiking, one where children could grow up with fresh, country air,
and one close to country clubs and shopping malls. One exception to
the traditional duty of nondisclosure is that one who elects to speak
must tell the truth when it is apparent that another may reasonably rely
on the statements made. Since the seller used off-site environmental
conditions to induce sales, the seller was then obligated to disclose the
existence of a landfill which could have a substantial negative impact
upon the value and desirability of homes in the area.' °5 The nearby
9 Landriani v. Lake Mohawk Country Club, 97 A.2d 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953).
"0 Curtiss-Wamer Corp. v. Thirkettle, 137 A. 408, 408 (N.J. 1927).
1i 349 A.2d 574 (N.J. Sper. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
'I ld. at 577-78.
03 Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
I' Id. at 148.
I d. at 149.
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landfill did impact the desirability of the homes--twenty-three potential
home buyers who did learn of the nearby landfill canceled their offers
to purchase.'06
The subdivision developer claimed that the homeowners should
be charged with constructive knowledge of the landfill because its
existence was so open and notorious. The court rejected that claim." 7
The seller and broker were experienced people who could have
informed the relatively inexperienced buyers of the existence of the
landfill; the doctrine of constructive knowledge could not be used as a
"shield of protection" by the developer particularly since the purchase
of a home is the single most expensive and most important transaction
for the average family.'0 8  Thus, the court found that the
builder-developer of those new homes and the brokers marketing those
homes had a duty to disclose to prospective buyers that the homes had
been constructed near an abandoned hazardous waste dump. The
builders and brokers, of course, appealed.
3. The Rationale of the New Jersey Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower court's
holding expanding the duty to disclose to off-site conditions, primarily
agreeing with the rationale in the lower court's opinion, but analyzing
the facts under more specific factors. The court held that a
builder-developer is liable for nondisclosure of off-site physical
conditions known to it and unknown and not readily observable by the
buyer if the existence of those conditions is of sufficient materiality to
affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of the property and, therefore,
render the property substantially less desirable or valuable to the
objectively reasonable buyer. " The Supreme Court began with a brief
discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor and its endurance in the law
of property. Courts have clung to the doctrine even though the purchase
of a home "'is almost always the most important transaction [one] will
ever undertake.""' 0 The court noted that it had "on many occasions"
questioned the justification for the doctrine, holding in 1958 in
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 150.
'0 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 429,431 (N.J. 1995).




Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc.,"' that it no longer applied to leasehold
property interests."2 Finally, in Weintraub v. Krobatsch,"3 the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a seller had a duty to disclose, in that
case, the existence of a roach infestation unknown to the buyers." 4
After a discussion of the law in other states, which included a
discussion of California's section 1102.6 form, the court framed the
issue to be decided: "In the absence of such legislation or other
regulatory requirements affecting real estate brokers, the question is
whether our common-law precedent would require disclosure of off-site
conditions that materially affect the value of property.""' 5 Two
principal factors guided the court in shaping a rule regarding the duty
to disclose: 1) "the difference in bargaining power between the
professional seller of residential real estate and the purchaser of such
housing"; and 2) "the difference in access to information between the
seller and the buyer.""' 6 The first factor caused the court to limit its
holding to professional sellers of residential property, i.e., to persons
engaged in building or developing of residential housing and the
brokers representing them. A person reselling residential property does
not have the same advantage of bargaining power as the professional
seller.' Looking at the second factor, the court found it reasonable to
extend the duty to professionals since they enjoy markedly superior
access to information.11
To establish a claim under this duty to disclose, the buyer must
show that the seller failed to disclose a material fact.' Whether a fact
is of such materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment and
thus the value and desirability of the property will depend on the facts
of each case. In addressing the question of whether the nearby presence
of a toxic waste dump was a condition materially affecting the value of
the property, the court simply answered: "Surely, Lois Gibbs would
have wanted to know that the home she was buying in Niagara Falls,
New York, was within one-quarter mile of the abandoned Love Canal
11 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
112 Strawn, 657 A.2d at 426.
"' 317 A.2d 68 (1974).
114 Id. at 68; Strawn, 657 A.2d at 426.
"' Strawn, 657 A.2d at 428.
I d. at 428.
"1 Id. at 428.
I d. at 428.
1 Id. at 429.
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site."'20 The physical effects of abandoned landfills are not limited to
the confines of the dump. Even without a physical intrusion, a landfill
may cause diminution in the fair market value of real property located
nearby.' The duty established by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
was not unlimited. The court explicitly stated that it did not hold that
sellers and brokers have a duty to investigate or disclose transient social
conditions in the community that arguably affect the value of property.
Builders and brokers should not be held to decide whether the changing
nature of a neighborhood, the presence of a group home, or the
existence of a school in decline are facts material to the transaction:
"Rather, we root in the land the duty to disclose off-site conditions that
are material to the transaction.' 22
The court concluded its discussion of the duty to disclose by
noting that location is the universal benchmark of the value and
desirability of property. The sophistication of professional builders and
brokers enables them to assess the marketability of properties near
conditions such as landfills, planned highways, or proposed office
complexes. With that superior knowledge, such sellers have a duty to
disclose to home buyers the location of off- site physical conditions that
an "objectively reasonable" and informed buyer would deem material
to the transaction, in the sense that the conditions substantially affect the
value or desirability of the property. 1
23
B. Statutorily-Imposed Duty to Disclose
1. New Jersey
Subsequent to the Strawn v. Canuso decision, the New Jersey state
legislature passed the "New Residential Construction Off-Site Condi-
tions Act,"'124 which became effective just five months after the
"0 ld. at 430.
1 In support of that statement, the court pointed to its decision in Citizens for Equity v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 599 A.2d 507 (N.J. 1987), in which it invalidated
a regulation of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection that prohibited an award
of value-diminution damages to owners of property located more than one-half mile from the
landfill area. The court states that "implicit in that regulation" was the recognition that the value
of property may be materially affected by adjacent or nearby landfills. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d
420,430 (N.J. 1995).
2 d. at431 (emphasis added).
23 Id.at432.
I d. S 46:3c-1 through 3C-10.
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decision. The legislature found that "the decision to purchase a
particular residence requires consideration of a wide range of factors
concerning the area in which the residential real estate is located."' 25
The legislature further found that an ambiguity exists concerning the
seller's disclosure duties and, thus, it was in the public interest to define
the entirety of the seller's disclosure duty and to create a public
repository of relevant off-site conditions.'26 The statute requires a seller
of newly constructed residential real estate to provide the purchaser
with a notice of availability of the lists of off-site conditions that every
person who owns or maintains any off-site condition is required to file
with the municipality where the condition is located. 27 For purposes of
the statute, the definition of "off site" is limited to nine conditions: 12
8
1) sites listed on the National Priorities List pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act;
129
2) sites known to and confirmed by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection;
3) overhead electric utility transmission lines conducting 240,000
volts or more;
4) electrical transformer substations;
5) underground gas transmission lines;
6) sewer pump stations;
7) sanitary landfill facilities;
8) public wastewater treatment facilities; and
9) airport safety zones
Essentially, the law requires that a seller hand the buyer a notice
of the availability of the lists filed with the municipality. The statute
does not require that the seller actually warn buyers about the existence
of any of the nine conditions. The New Jersey Legislature thus limited
the duty of the sellers to disclose off-site environmental conditions by
narrowly defining off-site conditions and by not requiring a seller to
make any affirmative disclosures directly to a buyer.
I2 ld.§ 46:3C-1 through C-12 (West Supp. 97).
26 Id. § S 46: 3C-2.
127 Id. § 46: 3C-8.
"' NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. S 46:3C-3 (West Supp. 97).
29 42 U.S.C. S 9601-75 (1994).
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2. California
In July of 1985, California became the first state to enact legisla-
tion governing disclosure of material facts about residential real
property.'30 The statute requires the seller and broker to obtain and
timely deliver a disclosure statement revealing factual matters regarding
the condition of the property being sold that might affect the value of
the property.'31 Such factual matters include the following: whether
any fuel or chemical storage tanks or contaminated soil or water are
located on the property; whether any major damage, such as fire,
earthquake, floods, or landslides, has occurred, to the property; or
whether any flooding, drainage, or grading problems exist. 32
This legislation was adopted in response to the California decision
in Easton v. Strassburger,33 which imposed liability on a real estate
broker for failure to disclose facts affecting the value of residential
property.'34 The court further imposed upon agents of the seller a duty
to inspect for defects.' 3 The buyer in Easton purchased property that
had a history of soil problems and landslides; the buyer was unaware of
the problem and was not informed by the seller of the problems.'
36
Shortly after purchasing the property, massive earth movements
destroyed the driveway. It was later determined that the fill material
had been improperly engineered and compacted.' The slides de-
stroyed the driveway and caused the foundation of the house to settle,
leading to cracking of the walls and warping of the doorways.'38 The
seller was represented by two agents who inspected the property prior
to sale and noticed evidence of soil problems. However, the agents did
not request that the soil stability be tested and did not inform the buyer
of the potential soil problems.'3 9 The sellers were aware of past
landslides, but did not tell the agents. 40
Under California law, the broker was required to disclose to a
,3 See Washburn, supra note 20, at 381.
"' CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-02.15 (West Supp. 1997).
32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6.
" 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
,34 id. at 390.
135 Id.
'36 Id. at 385-86.
"3 Id. at 385.
138 Id.




buyer material defects known to the seller but unknown to and
unobservable by the buyer. 4 ' The court, however, was concerned that
the purposes behind the rule would be seriously undermined if the rule
did not include a duty to disclose reasonably discoverable defects as
well: "If a broker were required to disclose only known defects, but not
also those that are reasonably discoverable, he would be shielded by his
ignorance of that which he holds himself out to know." 42 The court, in
essence, required agents to inspect the property for any defects.
Responding to the decision in Easton, the California Association
of Realtors sponsored legislation "to provide a framework for formal
disclosure of facts relevant to a decision to purchase realty." 43 The
statute clarified the agent's duty to inspect for defects by limiting the
duty established in Easton to a visual inspection of the property which
did not include a duty to inspect areas normally inaccessible to a visual
inspection.'"
The statute further required the seller and its authorized agent to
make certain disclosures about the property. The information given to
the buyer is only a disclosure; the statement is not a warranty and is not
intended to be part of any contract between the buyer and the seller. 4"
The section 1102.6 form requires a seller to answer either "yes" or "no"
to the question, "Are you aware of any of the following?" Among the
sixteen categories of property conditions that a seller must answer either
affirmatively or negatively as to its existence is one off-site condi-
tion-any neighborhood noise problems or other nuisances.'4 6
Noise problems were at issue in Alexander v. McKnight.'47 There,
the plaintiffs brought an action against their neighbors seeking equitable
relief and damages because of their neighbor's violation of a subdivi-
sion's declaration of restrictions.'48 The court held that where the
neighbor's conduct constituted a pattern of offensive and noxious
activities, the plaintiffs would have to disclose that fact to potential
'I' Id. at 387.
142 ldat 388.
'4' Sweat v. Hollister, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402 n. 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the
statute confirmed and clarified the disclosure duty that existed at common law).
'" See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6. See also Joanna L. Guilfoy, Note, Home Not-So-Sweet
Home: Real Estate Broker Liability In the Sale of Previously Contaminated Residential Property:
Has Broker Liability Gone Too Far?, 21 RUTGERs L.J. 111 (1989).
115 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.6.
146 Id.
'4 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
' Id. at 455.
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buyers on the section 1102.6 form if the neighbors were still living in
the subdivision at the time of the sale.
149
The McKnights, the neighbors, operated a tree trimming business
from their house, and thus used a noisy tree chipper. Operating the
business violated the declaration of restrictions for the subdivision. The
McKnights also engaged in other "offensive and noxious activities,"
such as playing late-night basketball, parking too many cars on their
property, and pouring motor oil on the roof of their house. 50 The
McKnights further violated the declaration of restrictions by building
a two-story cabana in their backyard and by constructing a deck without
a building permit.' The trial court ordered the McKnights to reduce
the height of the cabana and remove the deck unless a building permit
was obtained, and enjoined them from pouring oil on the roof of the
house. The court then awarded damages of $28,000 to compensate for
the diminution in the house's value that would result from the section
1102.6 disclosures-which would require telling potential buyers that
the McKnights, if still in their house, were difficult neighbors. 
1 2
In affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court stated
the purpose of section 1102.6 requires that the statute be liberally
construed such that it requires the seller to fully inform the buyer
regarding matters materially affecting the value of the property.'53 The
seller must disclose material facts which are known or accessible only
to him and which are not known to or within the reach of the diligent
attention of the buyer. The presence of hostile neighbors is a fact which
will not ordinarily come to the attention of someone viewing the
property "at a time carefully selected by the seller to correspond with
an anticipated lull in the 'festivities."" 4 A seller cannot ignore what
has happened in the past in the neighborhood and implicitly represent
to a potential buyer that the neighborhood is peaceful. The California
Code extended the duty to disclose to certain off-site conditions that
would impact the value and desirability of the property-noisy neighbors
and nuisances."' 5 The condition was not one which affected the
physical integrity of the structure but it would affect the psychological
149 Id. at 456.
1s0 ld. at 455.
Id.
52 Id. at 455.
"' Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
, S Ld. at 456.
's5 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6.
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In 1992, the Wisconsin General Assembly approved a property
condition disclosure bill. As was the case in California, the Wisconsin
bill was originally proposed by the state's realtor association.' Under
the legislation, in Wisconsin, a seller is obligated within ten days after
acceptance of a sales contract to deliver to the prospective buyer a real
estate condition report providing information about the property.'58
Certain types of defects must be disclosed if the seller has notice or
knowledge of them. 9 "Defect" is defined as a "condition that would
have a significant adverse effect on the value of the property, that would
significantly impair the health or safety of future occupants of the
property, or that if not repaired, removed, or replaced would signifi-
cantly shorten or adversely affect the expected normal life of the
premises."" 6  One of the twenty-eight conditions imposed by the
legislature requires a seller to disclose whether he is "aware of a defect
caused by unsafe concentrations of, unsafe conditions relating to, or
storage of hazardous or toxic substances on, neighboring properties."''
The Wisconsin legislature apparently decided that at least this one
particular type of off-site environmental condition must be disclosed in
order to protect residents from potential harm.
III. FACTORS FOR FORMULATING A DUTY To DISCLOSE OFF-SITE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
Several factors are considered in determining whether a seller in
a particular case has a duty to disclose on-site defects in property. The
objective of these factors is to weigh the bargaining strengths of the
parties involved to determine whether one party has an unfair advantage
over the other party. These factors include the respective knowledge of
156 See generally id.
117 Washburn, supra note 20, at 381.
"' WIS. STAT. AiN. § 709.02 (West Supp. 1996).
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the parties and their means of acquiring that knowledge; the relative
intelligence of the parties to the transaction; the relationship of the
parties to each other; the nature and importance of the fact not dis-
closed; and, the status of the concealer as either a buyer or a seller.'
6 2
Courts using these factors aim "to set an operable standard of fair
conduct in the marketplace."' 63 Although some courts applying these
same factors have been reluctant to find a duty to disclose off-site
conditions,"6 an analysis of these factors indicates that a duty to
disclose off-site environmental hazards could be imposed on builder-
developers. Though articulated separately, the factors are "interrelated
and overlap." '65
A. Knowledge of the Parties and Means of Acquiring Knowledge
About the Defect
Builders and developers obviously have superior knowledge of the
on-site condition of the property sold because they either built the
structure or developed the subdivision. The superior knowledge and
expertise of these professionals has led several courts to depart from the
rule of caveat emptor and find a duty to disclose, particularly where the
facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the seller, and the buyer
is not in a position to discover the facts for himself." When assessing
the quality of property or the structural soundness of a unit, a residential
buyer is not on equal footing with a builder or developer because the
home building industry has become more and more specialized in
modem society. Thus, fair dealing demands disclosure of on-site
defects undiscoverable to the buyer.
Likewise, builder-developers have superior knowledge of off-site
conditions located within the neighborhoods in which they are
constructing homes. Builders and developers assess the condition of
neighborhoods and the amenities available to residents living in those
neighborhoods before deciding where to build homes. They typically
become intimately aware of off-site conditions, often marketing
62 See Blaine v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
163 Id.
114 Id. at 709.
I6 d. at 707.
See, e.g., Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(holding a defendant subdivider-contractor liable for fraud when it sold a house and lot knowing
that the lot was in the area of an ancient landslide and that the house was constructed on fill placed
on the lot without adequate compaction).
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developments by emphasizing the proximity of off-site amenities such
as parks and schools. For example, the builder-developer in the Strawn
case marketed the development for its proximity to off-site amenities
such as a country club and shopping malls. However, it did not mention
its proximity to an off-site environmental hazard even though it
allegedly knew of the presence of a toxic landfill near the development
-a copy of an EPA report warning of the dangers of the landfill was in
its file.'67 The builder-developer also met with state employees to
discuss the possibility of building homes near the landfill. 6 The
builder-developer failed to disclose the existence of the landfill to
potential home buyers even though marketing directors urged them to
do so 69 and the New Jersey Real Estate Commission made known its
requirements of full disclosure because of the impact of the potential
effects on health and property values. 70 A builder with this level of
knowledge regarding the existence and hazardous nature of an off-site
condition should be required to disclose that information unless the
buyer shares and understands that same knowledge.
The existence of off-site conditions is often noted in public
records. When the buyer has little or no means of acquiring this
pertinent information about off-site environmental conditions, the
builder's superior knowledge can render the transaction unfair if the
builder does not disclose the existence of the site. However, where the
information is available and easily accessible to the buyer, the bargain-
ing positions of the parties are not necessarily unbalanced if the builder
fails to disclose.' 7' In Blaine v. J.E. Jones Construction Co.,1
72
homeowners raised claims of fraud because the builder did not disclose
its intent to build an apartment complex in the subdivision near their
homes. The court found that the plaintiffs had access to information
about the proposed apartment complex because the existence of multi-
family zoning and a proposed layout of the multi-family buildings were
a part of public record. 173 The court went on to say that a developer
could assume, "quite sensibly and rationally, that a buyer would check
the public record or ask the developer to acquire information about the
67 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420,423 (N.J. 1995).
168 Id.
169 Id.
76 Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
'7' See Blaine v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
72 841 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
I7 d. at 708.
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
zoning of [the buyer's own property] and of nearby properties."' 74
Public record of an undisclosed fact, however, should not
necessarily negate a party's duty to disclose. 75 A residential buyer
must have ready access to those public records before a builder's duty
to disclose can be negated. Professional sellers of residential housing
"enjoy markedly superior access to information."' 7 6 For example,
information about the existence and hazardous nature of the landfill in
Strawn was on public record in EPA reports, in correspondence from
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy to
the township, and in a health assessment prepared by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.'77 However, to require
potential home buyers to exhaustively search through extensive public
records, including federal and state documents, for the existence of off-
site environmental conditions would be unrealistic in light of a typical
residential buyer's lack of training and experience in property develop-
ment.
Furthermore, a buyer knowledgeable enough to inquire of public
officials for information about landfills, incinerators, and other
neighborhood sites threatening harm may not have the time or resources
to extensively research the meaning of public records, particularly
environmental reports, before closing on a home purchase. The average
buyer likely lacks the background to competently evaluate the informa-
tion in the records and again may not have the time or resources to seek
expert advice to aid in assessing the technical and scientific information
included in the reports prior to closing.
B. The Relative Intelligence of the Parties
A greater duty of disclosure is imposed on the intelligent party if
the opposing party is unusually ignorant.'78 Presumably, a more
intelligent party is more likely to be able to discover undisclosed
information.'79 The Blaine court found that where all of the parties
'74 Id. at 709.
171 Osterberger v. Hites, 599 S.W.2d 221, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
176 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 428 (N.J. 1995).
177 Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 145-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
'8 Nicola Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations,
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 174 (1993).
' Steven Koslovsky, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: An Overview of Fraudulent
Nondisclosure, 50 J. Mo. B. 161, 162 (1994).
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involved were college educated, no party's intelligence could be
presumed to be superior to another's."'8 A college education does
indicate a certain level of comprehension of information. However, a
college education does not equate to expertise and knowledge about
residential home building.'81
C. The Relationship of the Parties to Each Other
The existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between
parties makes it more likely that a duty to disclose will be found since
the relationship implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing.182 The
party who owes the confidential or fiduciary duty has an obligation to
disclose material facts within his knowledge.'s 3 The relationship
between the seller and buyer has not generally been considered a
confidential relationship requiring disclosure since the transaction is
considered to be at arm's length.1
84
However, the established relationship between a builder-developer
and residential buyer should give rise to a duty of disclosure. Such a
duty would arise where one party to a transaction, the professional
seller, not only knows that the other party, the residential buyer, is
acting under a mistake basic to the transaction, but also knows that the
buyer, because of the established relationship between them, is
reasonably relying upon a disclosure of the unrevealed fact if it exists.'85
Builders and developers are aware that the buyer's lack of training and
experience will cause these buyers to look to them for information.'86
Because of the seller's knowledge concerning factors affecting the
market value, buyers tend to rely on professional sellers. Good faith and
fair dealing require disclosure when this unequal relationship is
established.
... Blaine v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
" Even a home buyer with 14 years experience as a realtor was owed a duty by a broker to
disclose that sewers in the development had not been accepted by the sewer district when that
defect was not discoverable by reasonable care and visible inspection by the experienced realtor.
Seidel v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 904 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Mo. App. Ct. 1995).
2 Blaine, 841 S.W.2d at 708. Relationships of trust and confidence include those of
executor of an estate and its beneficiary, a bank and its investing depositor, physician and patient,
attorney and client, guardian and ward, and family members. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551 cmt. f(1977).
83 Koslovsky, supra note 170, at 127.
's Blaine, 841 S.W.2d at 708.
's' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. 1 (1977).
's' Osterberger v. Hites, 599 S.W.2d 221, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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D. The Nature and Importance of the Fact Not Disclosed
The duty to disclose applies to defects materially affecting the
value, habitability, and desirability of property." 7 Traditionally, these
defects have been latent problems which affect the physical property or
the well-being and safety of its inhabitants. A few courts have included
as defects those conditions or circumstances that may have a psycholog-
ical impact on reasonable buyers.' In all these cases, the defects
required to be disclosed were intrinsic defects, i.e., on-site. The courts
reasoned that there is a greater likelihood that a duty to disclose an
intrinsic defect will be found than if the fact is extrinsic to the property
affecting the market value of the house; an extrinsic fact is not
considered by these courts to be a defect in the house itself.8 9
Off-site environmental conditions affect the use, value, and
habitability of neighboring property, however, and thus should be
considered defects subject to disclosure by builders and developers. 190
Unlike ghosts and twenty-year old murders which have a psychological
impact on potential home buyers, landfills and other environmental
hazards can have a harmful physical impact on the health and well-
being of residents living near them. As the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted, the physical effects of "dump sites are not limited to the confines
of the dump."'' The proximity of homes to sites that threaten harm
should be disclosed by the builder and developer of these homes.
Landfills, like other off-site environmental hazards, threaten a host
of problems for homeowners living in proximity to the sites. One of the
most obvious concerns is odor. The decay of garbage produces a
variety of gases responsible for objectionable landfill odors which
degrade the quality of life even if the odors are not harmful to human
health.'92 Objectionable odors can constitute a nuisance.193 Likewise,
' See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985); Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130,
131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 888 (W. Va. 1982).
18' See Paula C. Murray, What Constitutes A Defect In Real Property?, 22 REAL EST. L. J. 61
(1993) (discussing a seller's duty to disclose violent occurrences on the property, supernatural
occurrences on the property, and the presence of inhabitants with AIDS on the property).
'8 Blaine v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
o Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431-32 (N.J. 1995).
191 ld. at 430.
H92 IOMER A. NEAL & J.R. SCHUBEL, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
56 (1987) [hereinafter SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT].
..3 Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 665,668 (Ark. 1993) (citing Ozark
Bi-Products, Inc. v. Bohannon, 271 S.E.2d 354 (Ark. 1954) where court enjoined operation of a
rendering plant which processed and disposed of the offal of slaughtered chickens because the
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the presence of rodents and insects, including flies, mosquitoes,
cockroaches, ticks, and mites can constitute a nuisance. These rodents
and other pests are carriers of potentially unsafe human health condi-
tions. 94 Certainly, the presence of rodents and objectionable odors due
to nearby landfills and other undesirable land uses impacts the desirabil-
ity, value, and habitability of property.
One of the greatest environmental problems associated with
landfills is the potential for leakage of contaminants into the groundwa-
ter supply.'95 This contamination poses a threat to human health since
residents in many areas of the country rely on groundwater for
drinking.'96 Like the residents living in the newly developed subdivi-
sion in Voorhees Township, homeowners living near landfills have
brought cases alleging that the nearby landfill caused pollution to or had
the potential to pollute their water supply.' 97 These cases demonstrate
why the average buyer would lack the desire to live near a landfill or
other similar environmental hazard that could bring objectionable odors,
rodents, and the threat of a contaminated water supply into his neigh-
borhood. These conditions are defects that materially affect the
desirability, habitability, and value of property.
E. Status of the Concealer
A seller is more likely to have a duty to disclose than a buyer.'
Builders and developers should have this duty to disclose because of
their knowledge, expertise and superior access to information. Further-
more, the modem builder may be analogized to the manufacturer of
goods-both have an intimate knowledge of the product because they
designed and constructed them; both are in a better position to discover
defects; and both are in the best position to reduce the incidence of
defects through careful construction.'99 The builder, like the manufac-
residents living nearby claimed the plants emitted odors and attracted flies).
t9 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 192, at 56.
195 Id. at 50. For example, Atlantic City once had to move its water wells to avoid toxic
chemicals seeping from a landfill area about a mile away from the city; the tap water had turned
yellow. O.P. KJSARBARDA & E.A. STALLWORTHY, WASTE MANAGEMENT 55 (1990).
96 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 192, at 50.
197 See, e.g., New York v. Ferro, 592 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 1993); DeSario v. Industrial
Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Wayne County v. Tennessee Solid
Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
198 KEETON ET AL., supra note 34, § 106,; Blaine v. J.E. Jones Construction Co., 841 S.W.2d
703, 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
'" Blake v. John Doe 1, 623 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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turer of goods, is in the superior bargaining position; fair dealing thus
requires him to disclose.
CONCLUSION
The duty to disclose off-site conditions should not be limitless-
it should not act as a "straightjacket" 2° saddling builder-developers
with an unrealistic obligation to potential buyers and thus inhibiting the
construction of homes in particular neighborhoods. Neither should the
duty relieve a home buyer of the obligation to reasonably assess a
neighborhood before deciding to purchase a home there. However, the
duty must acknowledge the expertise and sophistication of professional
builders and acknowledge the potentially detrimental effects of living
in close proximity to harmful off-site environmental conditions. The
parameters listed below seek to balance all of these concerns.
1. The off-site environmental condition must be of a permanent
physical nature.
The Strawn court stated that the duty to disclose off-site condition
was "root[ed] in the land." '' Thus, sellers would only be required to
disclose conditions which are of a permanent physical nature. In
addition to landfills, those conditions could include a planned super-
highway or an office complex approved for construction. 20 2 Builders
and developers should not be required to determine which transient
social conditions in a community will be material to a transaction. Such
social conditions would include the changing nature of a community,
the presence of a group home, or the existence of a school.2 3 To hold
otherwise would require builder-developers to extensively assess a
neighborhood for "subjective and emotional ' '2 4 conditions and leave
them with little or no guidance of what to disclose.
201 Blaine, 841 S.W.2d at 709.
201 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420,431 (N.J. 1995).
202 Id. at 432.
203 Id. at 431. There is some discussion in New Jersey about whether sellers who know that
their neighbor is a sex offender must warn potential home buyers pursuant to Megan's Law. Robert
Schwaneberg, Megan's Law May Force Home Sellers to Notify Buyers About Sex Offenders,
NEWARK STAR LEDGER, July 22, 1996, at Al.




2. The presence of the off-site condition must be disclosed when
it potentially threatens the habitability of the homes or the
health of the residents of those homes.
Because of the potential effects on health and safety, the proximity
of residential property to a landfill or other similar land uses should be
disclosed to potential purchasers. The doctrine of caveat emptor has
been eroded as courts have begun to acknowledge that the health and
safety of homeowners should not be threatened by dangerous condi-
tions, such as termite infestation and leaking roofs, on the property.
Likewise, the health and safety of homeowners should not be threatened
by hazardous off-site conditions. The threatened harm must be more
than of a speculative nature.
3. The existence and nature of the off-site environmental condi-
tion should be reasonably ascertainable to professional builder
and developers.
The resources and sophistication of the professional builder or
developer place them in a superior position to obtain information about
the presence of a site within a community and its potentially hazardous
nature. However, builders and developers should not be held to an
unreasonable standard. Thus, the duty to disclose should be limited to
disclosure of information about the existence and nature of off-site
conditions when the information is readily ascertainable to professional
builders and developers. Builders and developers should not be forced
to exhaust all sources of information before constructing. "Reasonably
ascertainable records" should include all the federal, state, and local
public records and other sources that professional builders and
developers normally assess when determining whether to build in a
particular area.
4. The duty should be owed to residential buyers.
The level of sophistication of the commercial real estate purchas-
ers usually exceeds that of the average home buyer. Commercial
purchasers bargain with builder and developers from a more balanced
position and have far better access to information than residential
buyers. Thus, a duty to disclose is an obligation owed only to residen-
tial buyers because of their lack of expertise and unequal bargaining
position.
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5. The location of the site and its condition should be unknown
and unobservable to the buyer.
If a buyer knows of the existence and the condition of the site,
then a developer does not have a duty of disclosure. However, when a
buyer is unaware of the existence of a site, or is aware of the site but
ignorant of its hazardous nature, and information about the site is not
reasonably obtainable and understandable, then the builder has a duty
to disclose the condition. Buyers should not be charged with
constructive knowledge of landfills.
An old adage states, "The three most important factors in real
estate are location, location, and location."2 5 Builders and developers
are acutely aware of this. They seek to derive benefits from off-site
amenities of a neighborhood and will choose to build where the
amenities are located in the vicinity. They market developments by
referring to the positive environmental attributes of a community such
as parks and other green spaces. Fair dealing in the market place
requires that they also disclose the existence of nearby environmental
conditions that threaten the health and safety of a community's
residents. Since a man judges of what he knows, a buyer is not in a
position to make a judgment unless the defects are disclosed by the
seller."°6 Thus, a homeowner should only elect to be in harm's way if
he or she knowingly decides to do so based on the builder's full
disclosure.
In an increasingly complex and technological society in which the
average person lacks the specialized skills necessary to construct homes
and appraise their value and soundness, the average home buyer does
not have equal bargaining power with builders and developers.
Imposing on these builders and developers a duty to disclose off-site
environmental conditions merely imposes on them a duty of good faith
in the bargaining process.
205 The New Jersey Supreme Court offered this phrasing: "Location is the Universal
benchmark of the value and desirability of property." Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420,432 (N.J.
1995).
206 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIE, supra note 23, at 225.
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